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‘Enemies of the People’: Populism and the Politics of (In)security 
Thorsten Wojczewski 
 
Abstract: Populists are on the rise across the globe and claim to speak on behalf of ‘the people’ 
that are set against the establishment in the name of popular sovereignty. This article examines 
how populist discourses represent ‘the people’ as a referent object that is threatened and the 
form and implications of this populist securitization process. Drawing on securitization theory 
and poststructuralism, the article understands populist securitization as a discursive practice 
that propagates a politics of fear, urgency and exceptionality in order to mobilize ‘the people’ 
against a ‘dangerous’ elite and normalize this antagonistic divide of the social space. While the 
proposed theoretical framework aims to clarify the relationship between poststructuralist and 
securitization theory and capture the nexus between populism and security, the case of popu-
lism broadens the scope of potential subjects of security and poses important challenges to 
existing theoretical assumptions about security as something designated by states’ representa-
tives and ‘security experts’. The article develops and illustrates its arguments with a case study 
on the (de-)securitization moves in the populist discourse of Donald Trump.       
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Introduction  
With the emergence of Critical Security Studies (CSS),1 the notion of the state as prime referent 
object of security has become increasingly contested and scholars have drawn attention to the 
possibility that the state can also be a source of insecurity for (some of) its people. Over the 
last decade or so, a different challenge to state-centric conceptions of security has emerged in 
the form of populism. Populists across the world appeal to ‘the people’ and pit them against 
‘the elite’ in the name of popular sovereignty.2 
While populism is often linked to nationalism, the scholarship on populism has shown that ‘the 
people’ populists claim to speak for are not (necessarily) identical with nationalist notions of 
the people, but rather represent the people as the ‘underdogs’, the ‘common folk’ or the ‘silent 
majority’.3 By accusing the establishment of putting its power privileges or special interests 
over the interests of the ‘common’ people, populists like Donald Trump de facto represent the 
political establishment as security threat to ‘the people’ and thus contest the official security 
discourse: “They've dragged us into foreign wars that have made us less safe. They've left our 
borders wide open at home. And they've shipped our jobs and wealth to other countries”.4  
 
1 CSS is here understood as an umbrella term for different post-positivist approaches that prob-
lematize dominant conceptions of security and seek to take the study of security beyond the 
strictures of state and military security. This broadening and deepening of the security agenda 
is driven by the theoretical postulation that security is, at least, partially a socially constructed 
rather than objective phenomenon. See, David Mutimer, ‘Critical Security Studies: A Schis-
matic History’, in Alan Collins (ed), Contemporary Security Studies (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2016), pp. 87-107; Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, Critical Security 
Studies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2014).  
2 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Represen-
tation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), p. 1; Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kalt-
wasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 5.   
3 Benjamin De Cleen and Yannis Stavrakakis, ‘Distinctions and Articulations: A Discourse 
Theoretical Framework for the Study of Populism and Nationalism’, Javnost – The Public 24:4 
(2017), pp. 301-19.  
4 Donald Trump, ‘Remarks at the Central Florida Fairgrounds in Orlando, Florida’ (2016a), 
available at {http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=123513} accessed 15 July 
2018. 
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The populist claim to represent and speak for the-people-as-underdogs resembles the claim of 
some strands of CSS to side with “‘the voiceless, the unrepresented, and the powerless’”5. 
While the CSS literature has examined how non-state actors can both be constructed as referent 
objects of security (e.g. ethnic communities) and as security threats (e.g. immigrants), it has so 
far paid hardly any attention to the relationship between populism and security. Roxanne 
Doty’s study on civilian border patrols on the Mexico-US border comes arguably closest to 
this research agenda. Though not explicitly referring to populism, Doty addresses a phenome-
non that captures, as I will show, an important dimension of the populism/security nexus: “what 
happens when it is perceived by a significant portion of the populace that the sovereign6 does 
not in fact recognize the enemy”, thus failing to provide security?7 Moreover, there are numer-
ous studies that refer to populism in the context of security but typically relegate – what is 
considered the conceptual core of populism – the elite/people antagonism to the background 
and associate populism with nationalism, far-right politics or the securitization of migration 
and borders, whereby the actual role and significance of populism and the populist notion of 
‘the people’ remain largely unclear.8 
Drawing on securitization theory and poststructuralism, this article examines how populist dis-
courses represent ‘the people’ as a referent object that is threatened and the form and implica-
tions of this populist securitization process. It conceptualizes populist securitization as a dis-
cursively articulated practice that propagates a politics of fear, urgency and exceptionality in 
 
5 Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 
p. 159.  
6 Drawing on Carl Schmitt’s theory of politics, Doty understands the sovereign as the actor 
who decides about the state of emergency.    
7 Roxanne Lynn Doty, ‘States of Exception on the Mexico–U.S. Border: Security, “Decisions”, 
and Civilian Border Patrols’, International Political Sociology 1:2 (2007), pp. 115-6.  
8 See, inter alia, Gabriella Lazaridis and Khursheed Wadia (eds), The Securitisation of Migra-
tion in the EU: Debates Since 9/11 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Michael Mag-
camit, ‘Explaining the Three-Way Linkage between Populism, Securitization, and Realist For-
eign Policies: President Donald Trump and the Pursuit of “America First” Doctrine’, World 
Affairs 180:3 (2017), pp. 6-35.  
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order to mobilize ‘the people’ against a ‘dangerous’ elite and normalize this antagonistic divide 
of society.  
By combing these two theoretical approaches and exploring the nexus between populism and 
security, the article pursues the following three research objectives: first, it sheds light on pop-
ulist dynamics, which have so far not been prominent in existing accounts of the construction 
and politics of security. The rationale for bringing the populism and CSS literature into dia-
logue is twofold: On the one hand, populists regularly refer to the concept of (in)security and 
the growing appeal of their discourses in many world regions has made them important actors 
in the articulation of security issues. The CSS literature, on the other hand, offers analytical 
concepts that can illuminate how (in)security is constructed by populists and to study the effects 
of these (in)security constructions. The article shows that securitization theory’s notion of se-
curitization provides important insights into the way in which populists speak about, practice 
and utilize ‘security’. It argues that key elements of securitization theory such as the definition 
of security in existential terms, oppositional logic of security and call for emergency politics 
are in keeping with populist politics and sheds light on how populist discourses can use the 
logic of securitization to divide society into two seemingly antagonistic and homogenous blocs 
and stage the populist actor as the ‘true’ representative of ‘the people’. As will be shown, this 
populist securitization move has three main elements: 1)dramatization and fear-mongering, 
2)simplification and scapegoating by designating a particular actor as the single cause of a 
security problem and ‘the people’ as collective victim, 3)propagation of a state of emergency, 
requiring a suspension of normal politics and the endorsement of the populist actor as the only 
one who can secure ‘the people’.   
While showing that securitization theory can help us in illuminating the nexus between popu-
lism and security, the article also uses the case of populism to highlight certain shortcomings 
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in the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory9; namely, the absence of a proper theoriza-
tion of the construction of the referent object and agent of security, whereby securitization 
theory can contribute to the reification of populist claims, and the ‘elitist’ character of securit-
ization theory that marginalizes “the experiences and articulations of the powerless” and at 
worst represents them “as passive recipients of elite discourses”10.   
Second, by building on and critiquing existing poststructuralist readings of securitization the-
ory,11 the article shows how a poststructuralist perspective can address the theory’s weaknesses 
and contests, in this context, the common conjunction of securitization theory and poststruc-
turalism in the literature. Poststructuralism offers a theorization of collective identity formation 
that avoids the essentializing and reification of identities and points to the discursive (re-)pro-
duction of the referent object and agent of security. Thus, in the case of populism, the populist 
actor, the people and the establishment are no pre-discursive subjects but formed in the moment 
when different unfulfilled societal demands are placed in a common opposition to the estab-
lishment and the populist actor asserts itself as the representative of this popular will.12 While 
the existing literature often draws attention to the alleged poststructuralist elements of securit-
ization theory,13 this article argues that such readings are ultimately based on a flawed under-
standing of poststructuralism’s discursive ontology. Hence, this article’s secondary objective 
 
9 Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1998).  
10 Matt McDonald, ‘Securitization and the Construction of Security’, European Journal of In-
ternational Relations 14:4 (2008), p. 13.  
11 Cf. Lene Hansen, ‘The Politics of Securitization and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis: A Post-
structuralist Perspective’, Security Dialogue 42:4-5 (2011), pp. 357-69. 
12 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005). 
13 See, Thierry Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and 
Context’, European Journal of International Relations 11:2 (2005), pp. 171-201; Thierry Bal-
zacq, ‘A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants’, in Thierry Bal-
zacq (ed), Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London: 
Routledge, 2011), pp. 1-30; Hansen (2011); Holger Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitiza-
tion: Copenhagen and beyond’, European Journal of International Relations 13:3 (2007), pp. 
357-83.  
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is not the “(re)discovering [of] securitization theory’s post-structuralist roots”14 but to show 
that there is nothing distinctively poststructuralist about securitization theory and to highlight 
the advantages of conceptualizing securitization as discourse rather than speech act.  
Third and finally, the article illustrates its theoretical arguments with a case-study on the Trum-
pian discourse in the United States and demonstrates how it uses security policy as a site for 
the discursive (re-)production of ‘the people’ and Trump as its ‘true’ representative. Applying 
securitization theory’s sectoral approach to security, which distinguishes between military, po-
litical, societal, economic and environmental security,15 the case-study examines the (de-)se-
curitization moves of the Trumpian discourse and demonstrates how populist securitizations 
can reify monolithic forms of identity. This, in turn, makes the populist leader itself a threat to 
different referent objects and sectors of security. 
 
Securitization theory and poststructuralism  
While security studies traditionally equated the referent object of security with the state, the 
securitization theory developed by the so-called Copenhagen School in the 1990s broadened 
and widened the scope of security beyond the state and its military security.16 This allows us 
to consider not only the state or the nation but also the populist notion of the people as a po-
tential referent object of security. Since its inception, securitization theory has become a very 
popular approach that has been taken up, critiqued and further developed by numerous scholars 
 
14 Hansen (2011), p. 385.  
15 Buzan et al. (1998), p. 27. Strictly speaking, the sectoral approach is not compatible with 
poststructuralism, since it predetermines what counts as security issue rather than treating se-
curity threats as discursive constructions. The article’s rationale for using the sectoral approach 
is twofold: First, the sectoral approach allows us to capture and illuminate the societal and 
political sources of the populist antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. Second, the 
analysis of the Trumpian discourse has revealed that the five sectors are the prime sites for the 
construction of (in)security in the discourse.       
16 Ibid.; Ole Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed), On Secu-
rity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 46-86.  
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and applied to a range of issues such as immigration and the environment.17 Securitization 
theory breaks with the notion of security as an objective condition and instead conceptualizes 
security as a speech act through which a target audience is convinced that a specific issue poses 
an “existential threat to a designated referent object” that has “a legitimate claim to survival” 
and therefore makes necessary the adoption of extraordinary measures to deal with it.18  
The assertation that security has nothing to do with the ‘reality’ of a threat but is constructed 
through language (the speech act) as well as the ambiguous understanding of the speech act as 
both self-referential act and intersubjective process have been widely criticized. Balzacq19 and 
Stritzel20 both argue that there is a tension between the Copenhagen School’s internalist con-
ception of security, which ignores the existence “external or brute threats”21, and the externalist 
dimension of securitization processes, that is, the intersubjective or “social sphere” consisting 
of “sedimented social and political structures” and the “constitutive rules and narratives that 
surround a single linguistic act” such as the securitizing actor with the authority and power to 
securitize an issue.22 Importantly, Balzacq and Stritzel attribute these tensions to the poststruc-
turalist impact on Buzan and Wæver’s securitization theory.     
The link between securitization theory and poststructuralism is established by Balzacq, Stritzel 
and others mainly because of the notion of performativity that holds that utterances such as 
saying the word ‘security’ are equivalent to actions and thus produce a security issue. While 
poststructuralists argue that language is productive or performative in that it contributes to the 
 
17 See, inter alia, Balzacq (2005); Thierry Balzacq (ed), Securitization Theory: How Security 
Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London: Routledge, 2011); McDonald (2008); Bill 
McSweeney, ‘Review: Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School’, Review of 
International Studies 22:1 (1996), pp. 81-93; Stritzel (2007); Michael C. Williams, ‘Words, 
Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, International Studies Quarterly 
47:4 (2003), pp. 511-31. 
18 Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 21/36.  
19 Balzacq (2005).  
20 Stritzel (2007).  
21 Balzacq (2005), pp. 181f. 
22 Stritzel (2007), p. 369.  
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constitution of the objects of which it speaks, this is no distinct poststructuralist insight but (to 
different extents) shared by a range of theoretical approaches with different ontological and 
epistemological positions such as critical discourse analysis (CDA), discourse psychology or 
different variants of constructivism that build, for instance, on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus 
and practice or Wittgenstein’s language games.  
Stritzel, who ultimately conflated poststructuralism with speech act theory in his earlier work23, 
offers a more nuanced account in his later works and acknowledges the existence of these di-
verse approaches to the role of language and discourse.24 While Stritzel makes the case for 
adopting a discursive reconceptualization of the speech act, he opts for CDA25 and dismisses 
poststructuralism on the grounds that it grapples with clarifying the relationship between lin-
guistic and other social practices as well as structure and agency. As a result, poststructuralism, 
as Stritzel claims, fails to take into consideration how “sociopolitical resources and power po-
sitions of actors, their political struggles and processes of authorization […] create, challenge, 
change or amend existing meaning structures, potentially establishing new discursive hegem-
onies […].”26 Curiously, these very issues are at the forefront of most contemporary poststruc-
turalist IR scholarship which does not predominantly follow, as suggested by Stritzel, a “Fou-
cauldian reading of discourse”27 but rather draws, even though to different extents, on Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s conceptualization of discourse28 and their discourse theory which 
 
23 Ibid.  
24 Holger Stritzel, Security in Translation: Securitization Theory and the Localization of Threat 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).   
25 See, Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Oxford: Polity, 1992).  
26 Stritzel (2014), pp. 39-40.  
27 Ibid., p. 27.  
28 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 
1985). See, inter alia, David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the 
Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Thomas Diez, ‘Europe 
as a Discursive Battleground: Discourse Analysis and European Integration Studies’, Cooper-
ation and Conflict 36:1 (2001), pp. 5-38; Roxanne Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of 
Representation in North-South Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); 
Eva Herschinger, Constructing Global Enemies: Hegemony and Identity in International 
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is rather superficially dismissed by Stritzel as being characterized by a “high degree of concep-
tual specificity” that “makes their reflections less transferable”29. Moreover, by relying on 
CDA, Stritzel faces theoretical problems similar to the Copenhagen School in terms of the 
relationship between speech act and its external context. CDA argues that discourses (con-
ceived as purely linguistic) are somehow determined by extra-discursive powers like the econ-
omy or the state and thereby makes a rather awkward distinction between discourse and con-
text, which raises not only questions about the explanatory power of discourse analysis but also 
about the demarcation between discursive and social practices.  
Given the variety of discourse-analytical approaches and common misperceptions of poststruc-
turalism, it is necessary to highlight the distinct features of poststructuralism which lie in its 
discursive, i.e. anti-essentialist and post-foundational, ontology. This discursive ontology pos-
tulates, first, a “decentering [of] the subject”, that is, the break with the notion of an autono-
mous, conscious, rational and complete subject that precedes its discursive formation and is 
the origin of meaning;30 second, a conception of discourse as relational and differential system 
of signification that relates differences to confer meaning and identity and breaks down the 
awkward distinction between linguistic and behavioural aspects of social practices;31 third, an 
ultimately undecidable political struggle between different discourses over the (re-)production 
of meaning and identity.32  
 
Discourses on Terrorism and Drug Prohibition (London: Routledge, 2010); Dirk Nabers, ‘Fill-
ing the Void of Meaning: Identity Construction in U.S. Foreign Policy after September 11, 
2001’, Foreign Policy Analysis 5:2 (2009), pp. 191-214; Dirk Nabers, ‘Power, Leadership, and 
Hegemony in International Politics: The Case of East Asia’, Review of International Studies 
36:4 (2010), pp. 931-49. 
29 Stritzel (2014), p. 43.  
30 Jenny Edkins, Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back in 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 21ff.   
31 Laclau and Mouffe (1985), pp. 105ff. 
32 Ibid. 
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The notion of discourse as speech act within securitization theory, by contrast, rests on an actor-
centred understanding of discourse that was developed in discourse psychology and applied 
linguistics and confines itself to the analysis of spoken and written language.33 While post-
structuralism’s discursive ontology is derived from linguistic theory – namely, Saussure’s 
structuralist theory of language that locates the meaning of words in their difference from other 
words, and Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Saussure’s theory that conceptualizes language 
as structured but inherently instable – it does not reduce discourse to language but rather draws 
an analogy between language and society insofar as the relational and differential nature of 
language can be applied to all dimensions of social reality.34 Hence, the basic properties of 
language, as Laclau argues, hold for  
 
any complex in which relations play the constitutive role. […] something is what it is 
only through its differential relations to something else. And what is true of language 
in its strictest sense is also true of any signifying (i.e. objective element): an action is 
what it is only through its differences from other possible actions and from other signi-
fying elements.35 
 
Such an understanding of discourse draws attention to a wide range of non-linguistic (often 
routinized rather than exceptionalist) practices through which security can be constructed and 
performed such as border patrols or immigration policies, an aspect emphasized by the so-
called Paris School in CSS in particular.36 In contrast to speech act theory, the construction of 
 
33 Jacob Torfing, ‘Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments and Challenges’, in David 
Howarth and Jacob Torfing (eds), Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and 
Governance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 6. 
34 David Howarth, Discourse (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), pp. 10/116.   
35 Laclau (2005), p. 68.  
36 Cf. Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (eds), Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Prac-
tices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11 (London: Routledge, 2008); Jef Huysmans, The Politics of 
Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (London Routledge, 2006). 
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a security problem to a particular referent object is, from a poststructuralist perspective, thus 
not simply the result of certain utterances such as ‘threat’ or ‘emergency’ but of the differential 
arrangement of particular objects/subjects within a specific discourse and it is also through 
these differential relations that the referent objects and agents of security are (re-)produced. In 
his seminal work Writing Security, David Campbell argues against the notion of a pre-discur-
sive, fully constituted subject such as the state and shows how the United States has been (re-
)produced through the discourse of foreign policy and its underpinning representations of dan-
ger. Drawing a political boundary between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, the discursive practice of 
foreign policy inscribes the boundaries and identity of the Self through modes of differentia-
tion, exclusion and Othering and thus constructs the nation-state as a space of identity, unity 
and order in opposition to the international as a space of difference, dangers and anarchy.37  
While Balzacq and Stritzel see a tension between the allegedly “post-structuralist speech act”38 
and the intersubjective context of securitization processes, Lene Hansen has sought to refute 
this critique by providing a “post-structuralist reading of securitization theory”: Hansen argues 
that a “post-structuralist understanding of discourse is at the centre of Buzan and Wæver’s 
theorization of security as a speech act”, “their ‘definition and criteria of securitization’ as be-
ing ‘the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have 
substantial political effects’” and of “their epistemological and methodological stance that se-
curitization should be studied in discourse as it does not need extra-discursive ‘indicators’”.39 
With recourse to Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of discourse, Hansen notes that poststruc-
turalism overrides the classical dichotomies between materialism/idealism or 
 
37 Campbell (1998).  
38 Balzacq (2011).  
39 Hansen (2011), p. 359, emphasis in original. 
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discourse/practice and problematizes Balzacq and Stritzel’s argument that the speech act is not 
related to context and neglects extra-discursive phenomena.40  
While Hansen claims to identify the “post-structuralist gist of securitization theory”41, there is 
very little evidence to support this appraisal. Apart from the fact that a poststructuralist under-
standing of discourse involves both linguistic and non-linguistic elements and would therefore 
not reduce security to a speech act, Buzan and Wæver do not, as suggested by Hansen, affirm 
in keeping with poststructuralism “the absence of an extra-discursive criterion upon which se-
curity can be grounded”42. In fact, they provide such an extra-discursive criterion, when they 
argue that “[s]ecurity is about survival”43 and identify certain “facilitating conditions” of secu-
ritizations such as the “features of the alleged threats”.44 While one could still argue that the 
identification of a certain logic of security can make sense for analytical purposes (provided 
that one treats these logics as contingent), what is more problematic, from a poststructuralist 
perspective, is their actor-centred perspective on discourse that ultimately treats actors’ identi-
ties as given and as origin of intersubjective meaning-construction. 
The Copenhagen School’s view of the construction of collective identities has drawn severe 
criticism. In a pointed critique of the school’s societal security concept, McSweeny accused 
Buzan and Wæver of conceptualizing identity in objectivist terms and treating identity as fixed 
or “a fact of society”, thereby reifying monolithic forms of identity.45 Hansen has sought to 
counter this critique by drawing attention to the alleged “poststructuralist roots” of the 
 
40 Ibid., p. 359.  
41 Ibid., p. 359.  
42 Ibid., p. 360.  
43 Buzan et al. (1998), p. 21, emphasis added. Thus, security and the mode of dealing with 
security issues are defined in a rather static realist fashion with a clear emphasis on authority, 
the confronting of threats/enemies and the adoption of exceptional measures. Cf. McDonald 
(2008), p. 565; Stritzel (2007), p. 366.  
44 Buzan et al. (1998), p. 33. 
45 McSweeny (1996), pp. 83-5.  
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securitization theory’s notion of performativity that constitutes the subjects of which it 
speaks.46 In other words, the subjects and objects of security are constructed or performed 
through the speech act. 
In their own reply to McSweeny’s critique, Buzan and Wæver have tellingly not followed Han-
sen’s line of argument but noted that, despite their idea of identities as socially constructed, it 
is possible to treat identities, once constructed and sedimented, as (temporarily) fixed and thus 
as potential independent variables in securitization processes.47 In other words, Buzan and 
Wæver made the deliberate analytical choice to limit their conceptualization of security as 
speech act to the performative constitution of security issues rather than collective identi-
ties/subjectivities such as the state. This also becomes evident in their account of the relation-
ship between societal and state security: While Buzan and Wæver define societal security in 
terms of “collective identities” that are threatened when a society fears that “‘we will no longer 
be us’”, they link state security to military and political threats to its sovereignty and other 
constituting principles,48 thereby decoupling the state from questions of identity.   
In this context it is significant that Hansen suggests that her account of performatively consti-
tuted identities is not merely the result of her poststructuralist (re)interpretation of securitiza-
tion theory but inherent in Buzan and Wæver’s approach.49 This reading of Buzan and Wæver’s 
securitization theory creates three problems: First, by suggesting that subjects are constituted 
through speech acts, Hansen implicitly endorses a linguistic reductionism that neglects the cru-
cial role of non-linguistic practices in the (re-)production of collective identities. Second, the 
argument that subjects are constituted in the moment of the securitizing speech act is incom-
patible with Buzan and Wæver’s conceptualization of securitization as a two-stage process 
 
46 Hansen (2011), p. 360.  
47 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, ‘Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Co-
penhagen School Replies’, Review of International Studies 23:2 (1997), p. 242-3. 
48 Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 22-3.  
49 Hansen (2011), p. 360.  
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through which a specific matter is moved in a spectrum consisting of non-politicized, politi-
cized and securitized issues.50 As securitization denotes the process through which a particular 
issue is removed from the standard political process to the security agenda, the subject (e.g. 
government, state or society) necessarily pre-exists the securitization speech act and cannot be 
constituted in it.  
Third, the linking of identity formation and securitization would imply that the construction of 
collective identities depends on the presence and designation of existential dangers and would 
therefore affirm the Schmittian dictum51 that the friend/enemy antagonism is the eternal and 
unescapable logic of politics. The same problem, as critics argued, also applies to Campbell’s 
poststructuralist approach to security which can indeed be read as if the identity of the nation-
state can only be (re-)produced through reference to external threats and dangerous Others, 
thus making the securitization of identity a matter of survival for every state. Against this back-
drop, other scholars, including Lene Hansen herself, have shown that identities can also be 
constituted and re-produced through less radical and confrontational modes of differentiation 
and are thus not premised upon threatening Otherness.52 By establishing a link between identity 
constitution and securitization, Hansen’s reading of securitization theory however appears to 
re-affirm this very logic of radical and threatening Otherness.  
Against this backdrop, this article contends that there are no distinctively poststructuralist ele-
ments in Buzan and Wæver’s theory and that Hansen’s poststructuralist appropriation of secu-
ritization theory creates elements of confusion into both securitization theory and 
 
50 Buzan et al. (1998), p. 23. 
51 See for the impact of Carl Schmitt’s political thought on securitization theory, Williams 
(2003).  
52 Thomas Diez, ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering “Normative 
Power Europe”', Millennium – Journal of International Studies 33:3 (2005), pp. 613-36; Lene 
Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: Routledge, 
2006); Bahar Rumelili, ‘Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the 
EU’s Mode of Differentiation’, Review of International Studies 30:1 (2004), pp. 27-47. 
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poststructuralism. Instead of promoting a poststructuralist (re-)interpretation of securitization 
theory, this article argues that the Copenhagen School offers no theorization of the constitution 
of collective identities/subjectivities and its relationship to threats and security. Therefore, the 
article uses poststructuralism as overarching theoretical framework in which we can understand 
and analyse populist securitization processes discussed in the next section. It conceptualizes 
collective actors such as states, people or society as discursive entities that are (re-)produced 
against the difference of an Other and thus lack an extra-discursive foundation on which their 
identities could be grounded or permanently stabilized. In other words, subjects can only con-
stitute themselves and practice their identity through identification with the subject positions 
provided by a discourse53 which, as a system of significant differences, “delineates the terms 
of intelligibility whereby a particular reality can be known and acted upon”54.  
While subjects shape and re-produce through their representational practices discursive struc-
tures, their active agency is limited to moments of dislocation,55 when “the subject’s mode of 
being is disrupted by an experience that cannot be symbolized within and by the pre-existing 
means of discursive representation”56. By disrupting existing Self/Other relationships, disloca-
tory events expose the lack of social objectivity and identities that can be grounded on an extra-
discursive foundation and prompt subjects to act in order to overcome this state of crisis. This 
act involves shaping and identifying with a new discourse that seeks to re-establish social order 
and identity by re-drawing the relationship between Self and Other.57 While all meaning and 
identity is constituted in relation to difference, it depends on the respective discourse whether 
 
53 Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolutions of our Time (London: Verso, 1990), p. 
44.  
54 Doty (1996), p. 5. 
55 Laclau (1990), pp. 39ff.  
56 Jason Glynos and David Howarth, Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political 
Theory (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 14.  
57 Thorsten Wojczewski, India’s Foreign Policy Discourse and its Conceptions of World Order: 
The Quest for Power and Identity (London: Routledge, 2018), pp. 26f. 
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it turns difference into an antagonistic relationship between Self and Other and represents the 
Other as an enemy and existential threat. A populist discourse, as we will see in the next sec-
tion, typically follows such an antagonistic form of Othering and employs a logic of securiti-
zation. Securitization is in this context understood as a discursive practice that makes someone 
or something into a normalized and existential security threat and thereby creates not only a 
politics of fear, urgency and exceptionality but also marks the boundaries of a particular col-
lectivity in an attempt to naturalize and homogenize its identity and mask over its contingency. 
This also implies that securitization discourses construct and reify a particular understanding 
and interpretation of security rather than providing the only way in which security can be rep-
resented and practiced.  
 
Populism and security  
Populism generally involves “some kind of appeal to ‘the people’ and a denunciation of ‘the 
elite’”58. The construction of this antagonistic divide between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ is at 
the heart of a poststructuralist, discursive conception of populism that draws on the work of 
Laclau and highlights that populist discourses (re-)produce the socio-political categories they 
claim to represent.59  
Employing the Copenhagen School’s sectoral approach to security, we can locate the populist 
category of the people as referent object of security first and foremost in the societal and polit-
ical sector. According to the Copenhagen School, societal security is about a societal group’s 
concern about its survival as a community based on a shared sense of identity that can be 
grounded on a shared language, ethnicity, culture or religion.60 While the Copenhagen School’s 
concept of societal security contests the equation of state and society/nation and calls attention 
 
58 Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), p. 5. 
59 Laclau (2005); cf. also De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017).  
60 Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 119/124.  
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to “ethno-national and religious entities” as “politically significant” units of analysis,61 it can 
also be extended to the populist category of the people. In populist discourses, societal security 
does not primarily revolve around ethno-cultural or religious identities but the identity of the 
‘ordinary’ people and threats to this identity emanating from a ‘corrupt’ elite detached from 
the concerns of the ‘common’ folk. The people/elite antagonism in the societal security sector 
is thus defined in moral terms62 and conjures up a threat to – what Paul Taggart63 called – an 
imagined “heartland” in which the ‘pure’, ‘ordinary’ and ‘virtuous’ people reside. This populist 
‘heartland’ is under siege from ‘inauthentic’, ‘alienated’ and ‘bad’ elites who are accused of 
depriving the ‘common’ people of their identity and way of life.  
The political security sector, which revolves around non-military threats to sovereignty, points 
to the political dimension of this antagonism that exposes the tension between democracy’s 
promise of popular sovereignty and the reality of elite’s rule. Given their purely discursive 
constitution, social orders and practices necessarily privilege certain actors, interests and de-
mands, while excluding, marginalizing or threatening others.64 As a result, ‘the will of the peo-
ple’ can never be fully represented or satisfied and popular sovereignty thus remains illusive. 
Populist discourses assert and thrive on a divide between ‘the people’ and official power by 
placing multiple unaddressed social demands into a common opposition to the power elite and 
making it the antagonistic Other that is blamed for frustrating the satisfaction of these de-
mands.65 The bearers of these demands become ‘the people’ that populists claim to represent. 
The formation of this collective popular identity thus requires the establishment of equivalen-
tial linkages among different social actors through the construction of a common negation or 
 
61 Ole Wæver, ‘Societal Security: The Concept’, in Ole Wæver et al. (eds), Identity, Migration, 
and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 23. 
62 Cf. Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
63 Paul A. Taggart, Populism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), p. 95. 
64 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005). 
65 Laclau (2005). 
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Other that can, at least temporarily, cancel out the differences among the members of this po-
litical coalition. This allows populist discourses to represent society as being divided into two 
antagonistic blocs: the people versus the elite, and to place the populist actor alongside ‘the 
people’ who gives voice to this popular will and thereby assumes the role of the representative 
of ‘the people’.  
Populism’s mode of antagonistic Othering indicates that the people populists claim to speak 
for is not identical with nationalist conceptions of the people: While nationalist discourses con-
stitute ‘the people’ through  an “in/out” antagonism against the difference of its out-groups 
such as other national communities, as De Cleen and Stavrakakis pointed out, populist dis-
courses represent ‘the people’ along the lines of “a down/up antagonism” as underdogs, pow-
erless and voiceless in opposition to an illegitimately powerful elite that is accused of failing 
to represent ‘the people’ and undermining popular sovereignty.66 Right-wing populist dis-
courses typically combine these two modes of Othering and represent the people as both un-
derdogs and nation.67 Instead of conflating populism and nationalism – a common tendency in 
parts of the literature68 – a discursive approach allows us to distinguish and study the relation-
ship between populism and nationalism by drawing attention to their distinct modes of antag-
onistic Othering.     
Populist discourses render ‘the people’ insecure by constructing the establishment and thus the 
very entity that is, at least in a democracy, supposed to represent and protect the people as 
enemy of the people. This threat and enmity results from an alleged disconnect and alienation 
between ‘the people’ and the power elite – an antagonism that is typically defined in both moral 
 
66 De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017), pp. 309-10.  
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and political terms. For example, a populist actor (e.g. leader, party or movement) can accuse 
the power elite of undermining the constitutive principles of the state by using their public 
office and power position for self-enrichment, clientelism and nepotism. Additionally, the es-
tablishment can be accused of selling out state sovereignty by joining or delegating decision-
making powers to a supranational or international institution which cannot be hold accountable 
by the people.  
When a populist discourse employs a logic of securitization, a populist actor draws on a politics 
of fear, urgency and exceptionality in order to mobilize ‘the people’ and unite them in a com-
mon front against the establishment. Crucially, ‘the people’ populists claim to speak for is, 
what Laclau calls, an empty signifier that can be inscribed with various (potentially conflicting) 
meanings and is thus characterized by radical contingency in terms of who or what ‘the people’ 
are.69 As a result, ‘the people’ mobilized by populists never represent a society as a whole, 
rather a particular political force is taking up the representation of a totality that is radically 
incommensurable with it and thereby draws a boundary around a particular segment of society 
which becomes the referent object of security.  
With its understanding of security in existential terms, its oppositional juxtaposition of referent 
object of security and security threat and its reference to emergency politics, securitization 
theory provides an important framework for conceptualizing how populists speak about and 
practice security and use it as effective mobilization strategy. By bringing together the key 
logics of populism and securitization, we can conceptualize populist securitizations and iden-
tify its main features:  
(1)dramatization and fear-mongering: conjuring up and maintaining the sense of existential 
threats to ‘the people’;  
 
69 Laclau (2005), pp. 69f.  
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(2)simplification and scapegoating: identifying and blaming the establishment70 as the single 
cause of this state of danger and ‘the people’ as collective victim;  
(3)propagation of a state of emergency: shifting and keeping particular issues into the realm of 
emergency politics as justification for populist politics.   
In a populist securitization move, the politics of exception is linked to the demand of disem-
powering the political establishment and is embodied by the populist actor itself who deliber-
ately employs a transgressive political style71 and proclaims with a sense of urgency that an 
existential crisis exists that can only be averted through the populist actor. While the acts of 
transgression should signal to ‘the people’ that the populist actor is no ‘normal politician’ and 
will defend ‘the people’ at all costs, the conjuring up of an existential crisis shall reinforce the 
need to rally behind the populist actor. By making the establishment an existential and normal-
ized threat to ‘the people’ and justifying the use of exceptional political measures (e.g. bypass-
ing intermediary institutions such as the media or the parliament), the populist discourse ho-
mogenizes and naturalizes ‘the people’ on behalf of which populists claim to speak and thereby 
seeks to create and maintain a populist electoral coalition.  
Though the societal and political security sectors are the prime sectors for populist securitiza-
tions, the populist notion of the people can also be a referent object in the military, economic 
and environmental sectors of security. In all these sectors, populist securitizations typically 
follow two basic patterns: either the establishment is accused of failing to securitize a particular 
issue that is perceived as a threat by a significant portion of society or it is accused of launching 
securitizations that pose a threat to ‘the people’ and have thus made ‘the people’ insecure.  
Populist securitization processes partially contest the typical modality of securitization, which 
is conceptualized as an elitist, top-down process by the Copenhagen School: “security is 
 
70 When populism is combined with nationalism, this scapegoating can also be extended to 
immigrants, refugees or other nation-states.    
71 Moffitt (2016), p. 44.  
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articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites”.72 Though the im-
portance of the endorsement of the securitization move through the audience is highlighted, it 
is ultimately the authority and institutional power position of elites, and state-representatives 
in particular, that initiates and shapes the securitization process. This also becomes evident in 
the facilitating role attributed to ‘experts’ such as bureaucrats, policy-advisers or scientists: 
“‘security experts’ are assumed to have the capacity to speak authoritatively on what consti-
tutes a security issue due to their background and qualifications, whereas non-experts are not 
usually assumed to have the same capacity to ‘speak security’”.73  
Populists, by contrast, derive their capacity to ‘speak security’ exactly from their status as (al-
leged) political underdog who is not part of the ‘corrupt’ and ‘powerful’ establishment and 
does not ‘play by the rules’ but speaks from ‘below’ in the language of the ‘common’ people. 
Accordingly, populist securitizations seek to appeal to ‘the people’ directly by bypassing in-
termediary institutions and experts and by using a rhetoric that is often deliberately vulgar, 
blunt and politically incorrect and relies on common-sense arguments. This partial deviation 
from the typical securitization script serves populists to claim a status as political outsider and, 
simultaneously, to delegitimize the establishment by denying and contesting the elites’ author-
ity to speak on behalf of ‘the people’ and securitize issues. The populist attempt of delegiti-
mizing the establishment, in turn, is likely to trigger counter-securitization moves by the estab-
lishment which frame the populist actor as existential threat to different sectors of security. In 
the following section, this article turns to the Trumpian discourse and investigates its populist 
securitization moves in different security sectors.      
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The Trumpian discourse and populist securitizations   
Portraying himself as political underdog, Trump rose to the American presidency on a right-
wing populist platform that combined anti-establishment with nationalist, xenophobic and 
chauvinistic sentiments. Like other right-wing populists,74 Trump shaped a discourse that con-
structs ‘the people’ by placing them into a common opposition to ‘corrupt’ elites and dangerous 
‘Others’ that are accused of depriving the sovereign people of their identity, jobs, values, rights 
and safety.  
According to Laclau75, the emergence of populism is typically linked to a dislocation of previ-
ously dominant discourses and embodies a more general social crisis that renders visible the 
inherent contradictions, hierarchies and exclusions of a particular social order and triggers a 
discursive struggle for hegemony. The Trumpian discourse, alongside with other right-wing 
populist discourses, can be viewed as both a reaction to and manifestation of the crisis of – 
what Nancy Fraser called – the “Hegemony of Progressive Neoliberalism” that combined ne-
oliberal economic policies aiming at the liberalization and globalization of capitalist economy 
with a “progressive politics of recognition” centred around “ideals of ‘diversity’, women’s 
‘empowerment’, and LGBTQ rights; post-racialism, multiculturalism, and environmental-
ism”.76 The hegemonic discourse deepened the social dislocations of globalization that rup-
tured, through the notion of an increasing de-territorialisation of social relations77, established 
modes of being and belonging such as the nation-state and encouraged a de-nationalization of 
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economic production and investment patterns78 as well as political rule and governance.79 This, 
in turn, weakened accountable, democratic representative rule and created new forms of soci-
oeconomic marginalization and precarious existence.80  
At the same time, the progressive neoliberal discourse propagates identity politics that aims at 
“‘empowering’ ‘talented’ women, people of color, and sexual minorities to rise to the top”81 
but deliberately marginalizes other forms of identity such as class and Whiteness. “Many white 
Americans”, as Mead noted, “thus find themselves in a society that talks constantly about the 
importance of identity, that values ethnic authenticity, that offers economic benefits and social 
advantages based on identity for everybody but them”.82 This perception exists, in particular, 
among White working-class Americans who saw their employment opportunities and incomes 
degraded in the course of trade liberalization and outsourcing and created feelings of political, 
economic and cultural disfranchisement.83  
As we will see in the following, the Trumpian discourse (re-)produces the American people it 
claims to represent by (1)conjuring up a range of existential threats, (2)accusing the establish-
ment of depriving the American people of their societal, political, military and economic secu-
rity through a lack of or misguided and corrupted securitization moves, and (3)claiming the 
need for a politics of urgency and exceptionality that links the survival of the American people 
to the election of Donald Trump: “We have to help our country. It is under siege in so many 
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ways. […] Either we win this election, or we lose our country”.84 Through this populist secu-
ritization, the Trumpian discourse could create and hold together a heterogenous electoral co-
alition, consisting of Christian evangelicals, free marketers, blue-collar workers from the Rust 
Belt states and the Alt-right among others,85 by appealing to shared anti-establishment senti-
ments and thus marking the Washington establishment as common enemy which becomes the 
negative projection screen for a series of different social grievances, anxieties or fears.       
The prime sectors for the populist securitization moves of the Trumpian discourse are societal 
and political security. In the societal security sector, the discourse represents ‘the people’ and 
the ‘American way of life’ as being under threat from “morally corrupt” elites86 and “mass 
illegal immigration”87. This process of antagonistic Othering indicates that this securitization 
designates two overlapping referent objects: the ‘common’ people and the people-as-nation. 
The construction of the elite as threat to the identity of the American people is grounded in 
morality insofar as the elite is allegedly detached from the concerns of the ‘common’ people 
and places its ‘postmodern' and ‘cosmopolitan’ morals and interests over the ‘pure’ and ‘au-
thentic’ values of ‘the people’ in the American heartland. When Hillary Clinton called 
“Trump’s supporters” a “basket of deplorables” who “are not America”88 during the presiden-
tial election campaign, Trump could not only claim that her comments are a manifestation of 
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the elite’s snobbism, decadence and self-righteousness, but also that he is “the voice of the 
forgotten men and women” and thus the only one who represents ‘ordinary’ Americans89: 
“While my opponent slanders you as deplorable and irredeemable, I call you hardworking 
American patriots who love your country and want a better future for all of our people”.90 
Accordingly, it is the alienation from the ‘pure’ people that has corrupted the establishment: 
“Her comments displayed the same sense of arrogance and entitlement that led her to violate 
federal law as Secretary of State, hide and delete her emails, put classified information in the 
reach of our enemies, lie to Congress, and sell government favors and access through the Clin-
ton Foundation”.91  
By accusing the establishment in general, and Clinton and the Democrats in particular, of pro-
moting an “open border” immigration and refugee policy92 that “bring[s] people here—in vast 
numbers—who reject our values”, the Trumpian discourse claims that “our politicians put their 
personal agendas before the national good”93 and collude with the very forces that are “threat-
ening not only our security but our way of life”94: “A country that doesn’t control its borders 
can’t survive. […] The flow of illegal immigrants into this country is one of the most serious 
problems we face. It’s killing us”.95 When Trump stated that he only wants “to admit 
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individuals into our country who will support our values and love our people”96, he appealed 
to nativist sentiments among White Americans and associated America’s national identity and 
culture closely with the notion of the United States as an ethno-religious community of white 
Christians of European descent.97 In other words, societal insecurity is linked by the Trumpian 
discourse primarily to the marginalization of this particular community in the US. Hence, when 
the National Security Strategy adopted by the Trump administration in March 2018 pledges 
that one of its key strategic objectives is to “protect the homeland, the American people, and 
the American way of life”98, this also implies the protection of a particular representation of 
US identity and thus of the threatened American heartland. By conjuring up existential threats 
to this imagined heartland, the Trumpian discourse not only seeks to naturalize and homoge-
nize a particular conception of American identity but also claims the right to use extraordinary 
measures to radically restrict immigration to the US and thereby protect the people that occupy 
or symbolize the romanticized American heartland. These exceptional measures included, inter 
alia, the promised construction of a “border wall to stop illegal immigration”99, the imposition 
of a temporary travel ban on certain Muslim-majority countries and the threat to use force 
against illegal immigrants.100  
While Trump has throughout his campaign and presidency described the situation at the south-
ern border as existential threat and “national emergency”101, he formally declared a national 
emergency in February 2019, enabling him to bypass Congress and divert federal funds to build 
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a border wall.102 The declaration of a national emergency allows the Trumpian discourse to 
further normalize the state of exception and the antagonistic divide between the people and the 
‘dangerous’ establishment: “Congress must get together and immediately eliminate the loop-
holes at the Border! If no action, Border, or large sections of Border, will close. This is a Na-
tional Emergency!”103 As we will see in the military security section, the Trumpian discourse 
has further reinforced the need for the securitization of migration and adoption of extraordinary 
measures by representing immigrants and refugees also as a physical security threat to the 
American people.  
While the populist construction of societal insecurity is primarily grounded in a moral divide 
between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, populist discourses link political insecurity to a peo-
ple/elite antagonism that is rooted in the political and more explicitly addresses the question of 
sovereignty. The Trumpian discourse represents the US establishment as an existential threat 
to the sovereignty of the United States and the American people. By asserting that the “political 
system” and the “whole economy” are “rigged against the American people”, the discourse pits 
‘the people’ against power itself and calls for exceptional and urgent measures to counter the 
threats to the constitutive principles of the United States: “The insiders wrote the rules of the 
game to keep themselves in power and in the money. […] this election is a choice between 
taking our government back from the special interests, or surrendering our last scrap of inde-
pendence to their total and complete control”.104  
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Hence, the Trumpian discourse represents the establishment as a small, illegitimately powerful 
group that exploits its position of power for its “exclusive benefit”, fails “to enforce our laws” 
and serves “powerful special interests” rather than ‘the people’105. Informing the discourse’s 
securitization moves in all security sectors is the assertion that “the American people” are not 
sovereign (anymore) but have been disenfranchised by “politicians that have sacrificed their 
security, betrayed their prosperity, and sold out their country”106. Following the logic of a pop-
ulist securitization, the discourse not only conjures up an existential crisis and threats from all 
sides, but also provides a radically simplified representation of security which marks the estab-
lishment as the root cause of all security problems. Claiming that Hillary Clinton and the Amer-
ican establishment are guided by a “corrupt globalism”107, which promotes “a borderless world 
where working people have no power, no jobs, no safety”108, Trump asserts that he is the only 
one who can prevent the complete loss of sovereignty and stop the ‘corrupt’ establishment from 
entering into new trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership which will “give up 
Congressional power to an international foreign commission”109.  
For constructing the image of Trump as the ‘true’ representative of the people, Trump pre-
sented himself as political “outsider” and “successful businessman” who, unlike all the “career 
politicians”, cannot be corrupted and speaks truth to power110: “I'm using my own money. I'm 
not using the lobbyists. I'm not using donors. I don't care. I'm really rich”.111 While Trump is 
thus in many ways part of the elite, he used his status as business mogul and billionaire as one 
of his main selling points by claiming that he stands aloof from the ‘corrupt’ political 
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establishment. This, in turn, would allow Trump to fulfil his main election promise: to restore 
the sovereignty of the American people through an “America first” policy that will “always put 
the interests of the American people, and American security, above all else” and steer the 
United States away from “international unions that tie us up and bring America down”112.  
By constructing an antagonistic divide between ‘the people’ and “the entire corrupt Washing-
ton establishment”113, the Trumpian discourse radically simplifies the social space and asserts 
that there is a single, homogenous popular will which Trump represents. Put differently, the 
securitization of the establishment makes it possible to appeal to heterogenous social groups 
and unite them in a common political project by presenting their demands as equivalent insofar 
as they share a common enemy that can be blamed for a range of social grievances.114 As this 
antagonistic juxtaposition automatically makes everyone who does not support Trump such as 
the political opposition or the media an “enemy of the people”115, the rise and election of Don-
ald Trump have triggered counter-securitization moves by members of the establishment that 
represent Trump as an existential security threat and call for exceptional measures to prevent 
or constrain Trump, respectively. During the election campaign, a group of “National Security 
Leaders” in the Republican Party pledged, for example, “to working energetically to prevent 
the election of someone” who “would use the authority of his office to act in ways that make 
America less safe” and “poses a distinct threat to civil liberty in the United States”116.  
 
112 Donald Trump, ‘Remarks on foreign policy at the National Press Club in Washington, DC.’ 
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While a typical presidential candidate would, in keeping with conventional conceptualizations 
of securitizations, generally seek to gain the endorsement of the party establishment and experts 
and rely on their credentials, institutional power or expertise to underscore her or his suitability 
for the presidency and authority to securitize issues, Trump could use such counter-securitiza-
tion moves for staging himself as political underdog who stands up to the ‘corrupt’ establish-
ment: “I speak for the people. So the establishment attacks me. They can’t own me, they can’t 
dictate to me […]”.117 While Trump is as wealthy businessman and even more so as president 
part of the establishment and thus speaks from a privileged subject position, he contested the 
elitist character of securitizations by dismissing the authority of typical securitizing actors and 
the idea that foreign and security policy-making “requires years of experience and an under-
standing of all the nuances that have to be carefully considered before reaching a conclusion”; 
instead of these “so-called ‘experts’”, “pinstriped bureaucrats” and “‘all-talk, no-action’ poli-
ticians”, as Trump claimed, it requires the “common sense” of people who are not part of “the 
Washington ruling class”.118   
In short, what are typically regarded as facilitating factors in the securitization process – insti-
tutional political power, expertise and the endorsement of ‘security experts’ – runs counter to 
populist securitizations and undermines its construction of the threatening elite, the people as 
collective victim and the populist actor as its protector. As a result, assuming office can pose a 
challenge to populists and make populist securitizations more difficult, since the populist actor 
runs the risk of losing its status as political underdog. For preserving the people/elite antago-
nism, Trump, like other populists in power, blamed the establishment such as the “enemy of 
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the people Fake News”119 or the “Criminal Deep State”120 for subverting his presidency and, 
by extension, ‘the will of the people’. 
The (re-)production of the antagonistic divide between ‘the people’ and ‘the establishment’ 
also characterizes Trump’s (de-)securitization moves in the other security sectors. In the mili-
tary security sector, the Trumpian discourse represents the-people-as-underdog by accusing the 
US establishment of putting the military security of other countries and foreigners over the 
security of the American people: “Many Americans must wonder why our politicians seem 
more interested in defending the borders of foreign countries than their own”.121 While “mili-
tary power” is the precondition for “national security”122, as Trump claims, the US establish-
ment has “badly depleted [our] military”123 and “failed to insist that our often very wealthy 
allies pay their fair share for defense, putting a massive and unfair burden on the U.S. taxpayer 
and our great U.S. military”124: “we spend so much on the military, but the military isn’t for 
us. The military is to be policeman for other countries”.125 Calling for extraordinary measures, 
Trump announced “historical increases in defense funding” amounting to a military budget of 
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$700 billion in 2018126 and threatened to pull out of NATO and refrained from explicitly en-
dorsing NATO’s collective defence principle.127 
While the US establishment prioritized the protection of other countries and “dragged us into 
foreign wars that have made us less safe”128, as Trump claims, it has failed to “secure and 
defend the borders of the United States”129 and allowed a “massive inflow of refugees” and 
“illegal immigration”130: “Every day our border remains open, innocent Americans are need-
lessly victimized”.131 By constructing illegal immigrants and refugees as a threat to the physical 
safety of the American people and linking them to crime, (gang) violence, drugs and terror-
ism132, the Trumpian discourse generates a politics of fear and scapegoating and conjures up 
an “onslaught of illegal aliens” on the US133. As we have seen, this securitization move has 
also resulted in the adoption of exceptional political measures.  
The populist dimension of this securitization move, which further reinforces this politics of 
insecurity and exceptionality, lies in the construction of a direct link between the ‘dangerous’ 
foreign Other and the American establishment. The Trumpian discourse represents the US im-
migration system, like the US defence policy, as corrupted by an establishment that has 
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“surrender[ed]” the American people “to the false song of globalism”134 and places the “polit-
ically-correct special interests”135 of “wealthy donors, political activists and powerful, power-
ful politicians” over “the well being of the American people”136. Accordingly, the establish-
ment is not only blamed for its “continuing reluctance to ever name the enemy”137 and thus for 
failing to securitize the issue of illegal immigration, but also for colluding with the ‘enemy’: 
“They don’t care about crime and want illegal immigrants, no matter how bad they may be, to 
pour into and infest our Country, like MS-13. They can’t win on their terrible policies, so they 
view them as potential voters!”.138 
In the economic security sector, the Trumpian discourse implies a similar collusion and con-
structs the US establishment as enemy of the people by accusing it of entering into “trade deals 
that strip us of our jobs, and strip us of our wealth as a country”139. While regularly scapegoat-
ing other countries such as China, Mexico or the European Union for stealing American jobs 
and wealth through unfair trade practices, Trump shifts the blame to the ‘corrupt’ American 
power elite: “America’s politicians – beholden to global corporate interests who profit from 
offshoring – have enabled jobs theft in every imaginable way. They have tolerated foreign trade 
cheating while enacting trade deals that encourage companies to shift production over-
seas”.140 By claiming that establishment politicians such as Hillary Clinton have “sold out our 
workers, and our country” for self-enrichment and special interests, the Trumpian discourse 
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makes the ‘common’ people and the national economy referent objects of economic security 
that can only be protected against the ‘corrupt’ elite through Donald Trump: “Our country lost 
its way when we stopped putting the American people first. […] I am running for President to 
end the unfairness and to put you, the American worker, first”.141 
In keeping with Trump’s election campaign slogan, the Trump administration has shifted eco-
nomic issues into the realm of securitization: “economic security is national security”142 and 
adopted exceptional measures by imposing a 25% global tariff on imports of steel which 
“weaken our internal economy and thereby threaten to impair the national security”143. In ad-
dition, the administration started a trade war with China by placing tariffs on $250 billion of 
imports from China “to counter China’s unfair [trade] practices” and “to protect the interests 
of working men and women, farmers, ranchers, businesses, and our country itself”144. With this 
securitization, the Trump administration has adopted an economic nationalist position that is 
not directed against neoliberal capitalism per se but rather combines deregulation and liberali-
zation at home, with protectionist and mercantilist practices abroad. This securitization also 
helps Trump in keeping together his heterogenous electoral coalition insofar as the negative 
implications of neoliberal capitalism are externalized and projected onto the foreign Other.    
While it has been the failure of securitizing a particular issue that underpinned the Trumpian 
discourse’s populist securitizations in the security sectors discussed so far, the environmental 
sector displays a different pattern. Here, the discourse calls for de-securitizing climate change 
 
141 Trump (2016g).  
142 White House, ‘President Donald Trump’s foreign policy puts America first’ (2018c), avail-
able at {https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-foreign-
policy-puts-america-first/} accessed 2 October 2018. 
143 Donald Trump, ‘Presidential proclamation on adjusting imports of steel into the United 
States’ (2018e), available at {https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-
proclamation-adjusting-imports-steel-united-states/} accessed 29 August 2018. 
144 Donald Trump, ‘Statement from the President, 17 September’ (2018f), available at  
{https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-from-the-president-4/} accessed 
2 October 2018. 
35 
 
and represents the establishment’s securitization of climate change itself as a threat to the mil-
itary, economic and political security of the United States and the American people:  
 
Our military is depleted, and we're asking our generals and military leaders to worry 
about global warming. […] We have millions of Americans who have mortgages 
greater than the value of their property, while middle-class incomes are stagnant and 
more than 40 million citizens are living at poverty levels. And our president is most 
concerned about climate change.145  
 
Following a populist logic, Trump blames the ‘corrupt’ elites for mispresenting climate change 
and claims that the idea of climate change is a hoax made up by experts, environmentalists and 
foreigners to harm the American people: “so-called ‘experts’ told us we were responsible for 
global warming, but then, when temperatures started dropping, scientists began referring to 
these variations as ‘climate change’”.146 The questioning of scientific evidences through seem-
ingly common-sense arguments and the simplification and personalization of complex phe-
nomena points to the links between populism and ‘post-truth’ politics and conspiracy theories. 
According to Trump, the myth that climate change is “man-made” has resulted in “crazy over-
regulation” and is “causing us to waste billions of dollars to develop technologies we don’t 
need to fulfil our energy needs” and is thus “really just an expensive way of making the tree-
huggers feel good about themselves”147. Consequently, the Trump administration has with-
drawn from the Paris Accord citing threats to the US economy and popular sovereignty as main 
reasons: “My obligation”, as Trump stated, “is to the American People. The Paris Accord 
 
145 Trump (2015b), p. 62; Trump (2016j).  
146 Trump (2015b), p. 61.  
147 Trump (2015b), pp. 62/65/82.  
36 
 
would undermine our economy, hamstring our workers, weaken our sovereignty, impose un-
acceptable legal risks, & put us at a permanent economic disadvantage to the other countries 
of the world”.148  
 
Conclusion  
This article conceptualized the populist notion of ‘the people’ as potential referent object of 
security and examined the patterns and implications of populist securitization processes. Draw-
ing on securitization theory and poststructuralism, it provided an analytical framework that 
allows us to understand how ‘the people’ populists claim to represent are constructed through 
a particular mode of Othering and how populist discourses can employ the logic of securitiza-
tion as political mobilization strategy in order to normalize and homogenize the antagonistic 
divide between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ and justify exceptional political measures.  
As shown in the theoretical discussion and empirical case study, securitization theory with its 
conceptualization of security in terms of existentiality, oppositionality (of threat and referent 
object of security) and emergency bears a remarkable resemblance with populist politics and 
can offer important insights into the nexus between populism and security. The article argued 
that security policy can serve as a site for the (re-)production of populist core categories such 
as ‘the people’ and identified the main features of populist securitizations to capture this pro-
cess: 1)dramatization and fear-mongering that conjures up existential and persistent dangers, 
2)simplification and scapegoating by designating a particular actor as the single cause of a 
security problem and ‘the people’ as collective victim, 3)propagation of a state of emergency, 
requiring a suspension of normal politics and the endorsement of the populist actor as the only 
one who can protect ‘the people’.   
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Securitization theory’s sectoral approach to security enables us, moreover, to capture the two 
dimensions of the populist people/elite antagonism. This antagonism can be located in the so-
cietal and political sectors of security and revolves around threats to the identity of the ‘com-
mon’ people and popular sovereignty. The case of populism also serves as a critical reminder 
of the elitist character of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory and the resulting nor-
mative dilemma of marginalizing or excluding the experiences and perceptions of those poten-
tial referent objects of security who have no, or limited, possibilities of articulating a security 
problem. Populism, in this sense, can be seen as a response to an ‘elitist’ security agenda and 
accuses the elite of either failing to recognize a security threat or of making ‘the people’ inse-
cure through misguided and corrupted securitization moves. While populist discourses contest 
the role of elites in securitization processes by designating the establishment as security threat 
and appealing to the common-sense of ‘ordinary’ people rather than the institutional power, 
expertise and authority of typical securitizing actors, their challenge to the elitist nature of se-
curitization is often insofar limited as many populists are themselves part of the elite and hold 
privileged subject positions.      
As populists typically claim to speak for the disenfranchised, powerless and voiceless, they 
articulate a referent object of security that is remarkably similar to the subjects of security that 
parts of CSS scholarship often foreground in its analyses. However, the populist notion of the 
‘common’ people is arguably not the marginalized subject of security that those CSS scholars 
have in mind, not the least because populism has typically a pejorative connotation and is as-
sociated with nationalism, xenophobia, anti-intellectualism or authoritarianism. This points not 
only to the ‘elitist’ tendencies within CSS scholarship and its complicity in propagating a se-
curity agenda that is detached from the concerns of certain sections of society, but also shows 
that siding with the ‘marginalized’ is, from a normative perspective, neither necessarily desir-
able nor emancipatory.  
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Following Laclau’s discursive approach to populism, this article understands populism as an 
ambiguous phenomenon that can be both regressive and emancipatory. While populism brings 
‘the people’ back into the political equation by linking together a range of frustrated social 
demands and pointing to a disconnect between ‘the people’ and the power elite, its transgres-
sive political style and juxtaposition of society into two antagonistic blocs can undermine dem-
ocratic principles and, when combined with nativist sentiments, generate a politics of insecurity 
that is directed against (im)migrants and other minorities.  
This ambiguity is also evident in the securitization moves of the Trumpian discourse. While 
the discourse articulates a legitimate critique of the negative implications of neoliberal global-
ization and the establishment’s failure to adequately address these security problems, its (de-
)securitization processes expose the reactionary and exclusionary sides of right-wing populism 
by creating the illusion of a homogenous popular will and offering a notion of the American 
people with clear nativist underpinning. Put differently, the Trumpian discourse designates a 
particular segment of US society as the ‘real’ people and asserts that Trump represents this 
popular will. In order to create and hold together Trump’s heterogenous electoral coalition, the 
discourse names with ‘the establishment’ and ‘foreign threats’ two powerful Others against 
which different demands and interests can be represented as equivalent and offers with the 
empty signifier of ‘the people’ an appealing source of inscription for a range of frustrated social 
demands. The bearers of these demands are the people Trump claims to represent; and their 
commonality depends on the presence of these two Others as common enemy which can cancel 
out the differences within the Trumpenvolk. This also explains why Othering and fear-monger-
ing are permanent features of the Trumpian discourse.  
By representing a particular segment of society as ‘the people’ and making it the referent object 
of security, populist securitizations are thus characterized by practices of exclusion and mar-
ginalization. This serves to highlight the problem that the Copenhagen School’s securitization 
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theory has failed to theorize collective identity formation and thus runs the risk of reifying the 
socio-political categories it seeks to analyse. For this reason, this article situated securitizations 
within a poststructuralist framework which highlights the purely discursive constitution of ‘the 
people’ populists claim to represent and understands securitization as a particular way of rep-
resenting and practicing security.  
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